The king said: ‘You speak, Nāgasena, of time immemorial. What does this word “time” mean?’
‘Past time, O king, and present, and future.’
‘But what? is there such a thing as time?’
‘There is time which exists, and time which does not.’
‘Which then exists, and which not?’
‘There are conditions (constituent potentialities of being), O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. In the case of beings who, having died, have been reborn elsewhere, time is. In the case of beings who, having died, have not been reborn elsewhere, time is not; and in the case of beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirvāna in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not—because of their having been quite set free.’
‘You are ready, Nāgasena, in reply.’
Here ends the Second Chapter.