The king said: ‘What is it, Nāgasena, that is reborn?’
‘Name-and-form is reborn.’
‘What, is it this same name-and-form that is reborn?’
‘No: but by this name-and-form deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (this Karma) another name-and-form is reborn.’
‘If that be so, Sir, would not the new being be released from its evil Karma ?’
The Elder replied: ‘Yes, if it were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, O king, it is therefore not released from its evil Karma.’
‘Give me an illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and the owner of the mango were to seize him and bring him before the king, and charge him with the crime. And the thief were to say: “Your Majesty! I have not taken away this man’s mangoes. Those that he put in the ground are different from the ones I took. I do not deserve to be punished.” How then? would he be guilty?’
‘Certainly, Sir. He would deserve to be punished.’
‘But on what ground?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever he may say, he would be guilty in respect of the last mango which resulted from the first one (the owner set in the ground).’
‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘It is like rice or sugar so stolen, of which the same might be said as of the mango. Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set another man’s field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: “Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man’s field on fire. The fire I left burning was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty.” Now would the man, O king, be guilty?’
‘Certainly, Sir.’
‘But why?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.’
‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask: “What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?” And he should reply: “I’ve not set your village on fire! the flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, was one thing; the fire which burnt your village was another thing.” Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’
‘In the villagers’ favour.’
‘But why?’
‘Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.’
‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form, which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price for her and go away. And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say: “Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?” And the other were to reply: “It’s not your wife I have carried off! the little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’
‘In favour of the first.’
‘But why?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.’
‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’
‘Give me a further illustration.’
‘Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying: “I will come for it to-morrow;” and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: “It was not curds I bought of you; give me my vessel of milk.” And the other were to reply: “Without any fault of mine your milk has turned to curds.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’
‘In favour of the herdsman.’
‘But why?’
‘Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.’
‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).’
‘Very good, Nāgasena!’