The king said: ‘Is there, Nāgasena, such a thing as the soul ?’
‘What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu)?’
‘The living principle within which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and discerns things (conditions, “dhammā") through the mind—just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.’
The Elder replied: ‘I will tell you about the five doors, great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste, and smell odours, and feel touch, and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?’
‘No, Sir.’
‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions? And so with each of its windows?’
‘No, Sir.’
‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to go outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so?’
‘Yes, I should know it.’
‘And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would you be aware of his having done so?’
‘Yes, I should know it.’
‘Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness ?’
‘Yes, it would know it.’
‘But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things?’
‘Certainly not.’
‘Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now suppose, O king, a man were to have a hundred vessels of honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man’s mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been thrown was sweet or whether it was not?’
‘No, Sir.’
‘But why not?’
‘Because the honey could not get into his mouth.’
‘Then, great king, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately.’
‘I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner. Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands.’
Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying: ‘It is by reason, O king, of the eye and of forms that sight arises, and those other conditions—contact, sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention —arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. And so herein there is no such thing as soul (Vedagu).’