The king said: ‘Does thought-perception arise wherever sight arises ?’
‘Yes, O king, where the one is there is the other.’ And which of the two arises first?’
‘First sight, then thought.’
‘Then does the sight issue, as it were, a command to thought, saying: “Do you spring up there where I have? or does thought issue command to sight, saying: Where you spring up there will I.”’
‘It is not so, great king. There is no intercourse between the one and the other.’
‘Then how is it, Sir, that thought arises wherever sight does?’
‘Because of there being a sloping down, and because of there being a door, and because of there being a habit, and because of there being an association.’
‘How is that? Give me an illustration of mind arising where sight arises because of there being a sloping down.’
‘Now what do you think, great king? When it rains, where will the water go to?’
‘It will follow the slope of the ground.’
‘And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to?’
‘It would go the same way as the first water had gone.’
‘What then? Does the first water issue, as it were, command to the second, saying: “Do you go where I have?” Or does the second issue command to the first, saying: “Whithersoever you go, thither will I”?’
‘It is not so, Sir. There is no intercourse between the two. Each goes its way because of the slope of the ground.’
‘Just so, great king, is it by reason of the natural slope that where sight has arisen there also does thought arise. And neither does the sight-perception issue command to the mind-perception, saying: “Where I have arisen, there do thou also spring up;” nor does the mind-perception inform the sight-perception, saying: “Where thou hast arisen, there will I also spring up.” There is no conversation, as it were, between them. All that happens, happens through natural slope.’
‘Now give me an illustration of there being a door.’
‘What do you think, great king? Suppose a king had a frontier city, and it was strongly defended with towers and bulwarks, and had only one gateway. If a man wanted to leave the city, how would he go out?’
‘By the gate, certainly.’
‘And if another man wanted to leave it, how would he go out?’
‘The same way as the first.’
‘What then? Would the first man tell the second: “Mind you go out the same way as I do”? Or would the second tell the first: “The way you go out, I shall go out too”?’
‘Certainly not, Sir. There would be no communication between them. They would go that way because that was the gate.’
‘Just so, great king, with thought and sight.’
‘Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.’
‘What do you think, great king? If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go?’
‘The same as the first.’
‘But would the first tell the second to go where it went, or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone?’
‘No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.’
‘Just so, great king, with sight and thought.’
‘Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.’
‘In the art of calculating by using the joints of the fingers as signs or marks, in the art of arithmetic pure and simple, in the art of estimating the probable yield of growing crops, and in the art of writing, O king, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.’
And in response to similar questions, the Elder declared that in the same way thought sprang up wherever there was hearing, or taste, or smell, or touch: that in each case it was subsequent to the other, but arose without communication from The natural causes above set out.